Bevolent Planners, Malevolent Dictators and Democratic Voters by Agell, Jonas & Persson, Mats







Benevolent Planners, Malevolent Dictators  








a Department of Economics, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden; Email: JA@ne.su.se 
 





We study the size of government and of GDP, under autocratic and democratic rule, 
respectively. It turns out that first, both democratic and authoritarian rulers apply the 
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1. Introduction 
While the ethical and moral advantage of democracy over autocratic rule is undisputed, there 
seems to be less agreement as to whether democracy is also economically advantageous. 
Some authors have argued that democratic voting markets work as well as economic markets, 
and that democracy can be expected to sustain efficient economic outcomes.
1 Others have 
argued that both democratic majorities and autocrats have an interest in setting tax rates so as 
to expropriate the greatest amount of resources possible from the rest of society. Unless it is 
supplemented with constitutional constraints on the exercise of majority power, democracy 
will therefore produce outcomes mimicking those of the revenue-maximizing Leviathan.
2  
In a number of publications, Mancur Olson has – independently, and jointly with 
Martin McGuire – initiated a systematic analysis of how democratic and authoritarian 
governments determine tax rates and spending on productive public goods.
3 Olson and 
McGuire conclude that democracy will have an economic advantage over rent-maximizing 
autocracy; income taxes will be lower, there will be more spending on productive public 
goods, and the gross domestic product and output per worker will be higher. Since a 
democratic majority earns a significant share of market income in society, it will have an 
incentive to pay for productive public goods, and to keep tax distortions within tolerable 
limits. By contrast, since an autocrat only cares about market income insofar as it affects the 
tax base, he will push the tax rate to the revenue-maximizing level.  
Niskanen (2003) formulates a related analysis of the effects of form of government on 
fiscal choices and economic efficiency. He concludes that for plausible parameter values, a 
democratic government will spend about 70 percent more on productive public goods than an 
autocratic government, and levy an average tax rate that is about 20 percentage points lower 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Wittman (1989). 
2 See Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
3 See Olson (1991, 1993, 2000) and McGuire and Olson (1996).   2
which, in combination, will give rise to an output per worker that is about 50 percent higher 
(Niskanen, 2003, p. 108). 
Here, we derive new theoretical results on the effects of form of government on the 
design of fiscal policy. Following McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (2003), we study 
the impact of type of government on public spending that enhances the productivity of 
workers, as well as on the extent of income redistribution accomplished through a system of 
linear income taxation.
4 However, unlike McGuire and Olson, and Niskanen, we rely on a 
model that is derived from microeconomic principles. We follow the literature on optimal 
income taxation in specifying a general equilibrium model of a pure labor economy with 
heterogeneous workers, to which we add a simple public goods technology. This allows us to 
analyze how “deep” parameters reflecting preferences, technology and ability distributions 
shape the incentives of democratic and authoritarian governments, respectively.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, irrespective of the form of 
government, spending on productive public goods will be such that the sum of the marginal 
productivity increments for all workers equals the direct marginal resource cost of providing 
the good. Thus, it will be in the best interest of both a (median voter) democracy and a 
rational dictator to honor the Samuelson (1954) criterion for the optimal provision of public 
goods. While Samuelson derived this criterion for a first-best environment, we show that both 
a democracy and a dictator will apply the criterion also in a second-best world of distortive 
taxation. This conclusion, which differs sharply from those of McGuire and Olson (1996) and 
Niskanen (2003), can be traced to the fact that both democratic and authoritarian rulers have 
incentives to counter tax distortions by investing resources in goods that increase the 
productivity of workers.  
                                                 
4 Like McGuire and Olsson (1996) and Niskanen (2003) we confine ourselves to studying a static problem, 
abstracting from capital investments and problems of time consistency.   3
Second, we show that the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the 
net-of-tax wage is decisive in determining whether democracy or autocracy will lead to the 
highest output. When labor supply is sufficiently inelastic, autocratic governments will in fact 
achieve higher output than democratic governments. Intuitively, when the uncompensated 
labor supply elasticity is close to zero, a rent-maximizing dictator can raise income taxes, and 
pocket the proceeds (after having paid for spending on public goods), at a modest cost in 
terms of foregone work hours among his citizens. In a democracy, the part of tax revenue that 
is not spent on public goods is instead returned to taxpayers as transfers, which will create 
income effects that tend to reduce labor supply along both the intensive and extensive labor 
supply margins.  
Third, we characterize under what circumstances democracy mimics the outcome 
under Leviathan dictatorship, as predicted by e.g. Brennan and Buchanan (1980). In line with 
the median voter theory of income redistribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981), our model 
predicts that democracy will result in more redistributive taxation and a larger size of 
government, the larger the difference between median and average ability. When the ability 
distribution is sufficiently skewed, the median voter will be an agent who lives on transfers 
and does not participate in the labor force. In such a society, the democratic majority will 
behave like a rational autocrat, who chooses the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue, and who 
does not bother about deadweight loss.  
While this paper is inspired by some recent work on the fiscal choices of autocratic 
and democratic governments, it is also related to two other, recent strands of literature. The 
literature on political economy has developed new, refined models of voter behavior, interest 
groups and representative democracy.
5 We abstract from such complications, and rely on a 
simpler model of democracy, the median voter model. While we acknowledge that this model 
                                                 
5 For recent overviews, see Besley and Case (2003) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).    4
has its limitations, we still think it offers a useful starting point for an analysis that attempts to 
clarify the first-order differences between autocratic and democratic rule.  
Our analysis also relates to a large public economics literature on the criteria for the 
optimal supply of public goods. Following Pigou (1947), many authors have suggested that 
the simple Samuelson criterion does not apply in environments where policymakers have 
distributional objectives and have to rely on distortive taxation to finance spending on public 
goods. More recently, it has been shown that there are special cases, where the classic 
Samuelson criterion is the correct optimality rule for a benevolent social planner who cares 
about distribution and wants to minimize the labor supply distortions from income taxation.
6 
Our analysis contributes to this literature. While previous studies have examined the 
applicability of the Samuelson criterion from a normative point of view, we study it from the 
point of view of positive political economy. We thus clarify under what circumstances 
democratic and authoritarian rulers will find it in their own best interest to apply the 
Samuelson criterion when they invest in productive public goods.  
The next section introduces some basic assumptions. Section 3 contains general 
characterizations of the fiscal incentives facing benevolent planners, and autocratic and 
democratic rulers. Section 4 provides some illustrative calculations. In the concluding section 
we apply our theoretical considerations to an analysis of the potential effects of population 
ageing on the fiscal choices of developed democracies over the coming decades.  
 
2. Technology, productive public services and the tools of redistribution 
2.1 Preferences and technology 
We consider an economy where there is a continuum of agents, characterized by a distribution 
of innate abilities, defined over the interval [ ] a a, , where a and a  are the lower and upper   5
support of the ability distribution. We normalize the total population mass to unity, and let F(a) 
denote the cumulative distribution function. Each agent i has a time endowment of one unit, 
and derives utility from consuming a consumption good in quantity ci, and disutility from time 
spent working in the labor market,  :  i n
 ) .           ( 1 )   , ( i i i n c u u =
The utility function is twice continuously differentiable, quasi-concave, and with   and 
. Agents supply labor in a perfect labor market and obtain an hourly wage rate w
0 > c u
0 < n u i. We 
assume that all agents are perfect substitutes in the production of the consumption good, and 
that there is a linear production technology; under these assumptions, wages and wage 
relativities will not depend on labor supply.  
We assume that the government spends money on some public service, g, which 
augments the productivity of the private sector. Like McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen 
(2003), we disregard all complications that would follow from introducing productive public 
capital, and we treat g as a flow variable created by tax-financed purchases of the private 
consumption good.
7 We assume that this service is not subject to congestion effects, so that an 
extra dollar spent on g increases the productivity of all agents. For every agent i, productivity 
thus depends on public spending and on innate ability: 
i i i a g A a g w w ) ( ) , ( = = .         ( 2 )  
We assume that the A(g) function satisfies  
0 ) 0 ( = A           ( 3 a )  
0 > ∂ ∂ g A           ( 3 b )  
0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ g A .           ( 3 c )  
                                                                                                                                                         
6 See e.g. Atkinson and Stern (1974), Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and 
Keen (1993). For a recent review, see Kaplow (2004).  
7 See also Barro (1990).   6
These technical assumptions ensure that the government always invests some resources in the 
public good (equation (3a)), and that the government solves a well-defined concave 
optimization problem (equations (3b)-(3c)). The strong and unproven assumption – on which 
some of our results will depend – underlying (2) is that public spending gives a proportional 
boost to the labor productivity of low- and high-ability agents. It is not difficult to think of 
alternative assumptions. Public spending on higher education might best be regarded as a 
category that contributes mainly to increasing the productivity of high-ability agents, while 
spending on public libraries or public transportation might matter relatively more for the labor 
market productivity of low-ability agents. In any case, we view (2) as a useful benchmark.  
 
2.2 Fiscal redistribution 
Tax revenue is used for three purposes: to finance redistribution, to finance public spending on 
productive public goods, g, and to raise income for the dictator (under autocracy). Under each 
form of government we assume that the government uses a linear income tax system with two 
parameters: a constant marginal tax rate t, and a lump-sum social transfer k. The individual’s 
budget constraint can thus be written as  
  k t w n c i i i + − = ) 1 ( ,          ( 4 )  
where   and  . [ 1 , 0 ∈ t ]
                                                
0 ≥ k
8 For individuals who do not work, consumption equals the social 
transfer. With positive t and k, the tax system is progressive in the sense that the average tax 
rate increases with pre-tax labor income.  
Under democracy, equation (4) applies to all agents in the economy, including the 
median voter, who sets t, k and g so as to maximize her indirect utility (subject to the 
government’s budget constraint, discussed below). Under autocracy, equation (4) applies to 
 
8 While there is no a priori restriction on the sign of k, a negative k cannot generally be implemented on low-
income earners. If we assume that a  (the lower limit of innate ability) can be equal to zero, we thus have 
implicitly assumed that  .   0 ≥ k  7
all agents except the autocrat, who sets t, k and g, and expropriates the difference between 
gross tax revenue and spending on public goods. The median voter in a democracy may well 
prefer a strictly positive k. An autocrat would prefer a positive k only if it would produce an 
increase in tax revenue that more than compensates for the budgetary cost of paying a social 
transfer. If leisure is a normal good, however, this is not possible. Thus, under autocracy, the 
optimal k will in fact always be equal to zero. 
In our view, this way of modeling redistribution captures a key difference between 
democratic and autocratic rule. Our median voter has to obey the tax rules of her own design, 
and income is the only legitimate source of redistribution. As a consequence, the median voter 
cannot target income redistribution perfectly, which will result in a leakage of tax revenue to 
agents with lower incomes than that of the median voter. Our dictator, by contrast, exempts 
himself from taxation and confiscates all tax revenue; thus, the autocrat can target income 
redistribution perfectly. This characterization of income redistribution under democracy and 
autocracy is obviously an approximation. While democracies have constitutions that rule out 
discriminatory tax policy, it is not so difficult to find examples where various tax exemptions 
are introduced for the purpose of benefiting strategic electoral groups.  
 
2.3 Labor supply: discrete and continuous incentive margins 
Agents maximize the utility function (1), subject to  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ n  and the budget constraint (4). 
The first-order condition becomes: 
  () ( ) 0 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( = + − + − + − i i i n i i i i c n k n t w u t w n k n t w u .    (5) 
Equation (5) gives us the labor supply function 
) ), 1 ( ( k t w n n i i − = .          ( 6 )  
We make the standard assumption that both leisure and consumption are normal goods; this 
implies, e.g., that the sign of  ) 1 ( t w n i i − ∂ ∂  is indeterminate, while  0 < ∂ ∂ k ni .    8
The continuous labor supply function (6) applies to the agents who choose to 
participate in the labor force. Low-productivity agents may end up in a corner solution, where 
they supply zero hours of work and live off social transfers. As will be shown below, it is 
when low-productive agents who live off transfers form the decisive group that fiscal choices 
in a democracy may mimic choices under dictatorship. To identify the group of low-
productive agents, we set   in (5), and solve for the wage w* that gives a zero net utility 
gain from a marginal increase in labor supply: 
0 = i n
1( , 0 )
*









0 .         ( 7 )  
Combining (7) and (2), we can solve for the ability level a* for an individual who is exactly 
indifferent between participation and nonparticipation in the labor market: 
 
1( , 0 )
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Low-ability agents with   live off social transfers and supply zero work hours, while 
agents with   supply labor according to (6). It is straightforward to show that 
* a ai ≤






















.         ( 9 )  
More spending on productive public goods tends to increase labor force participation, while 
higher income taxes and more generous social transfers work in the other direction.  
 
2.4 The role of income effects under autocracy and democracy  
McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (2003) argue that democratic governments generate 
more output and higher labor productivity than rational autocrats. The results shown below 
suggest that for certain consumer preferences, output and productivity will in fact be higher 
under autocracy. An important reason for these conflicting findings is that the reduced-form 
models of McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (2003) fail to distinguish between the   9
counteracting income and substitution effects on labor supply that are created via 
redistributive taxation and social transfers.  
  Consider two governments, one authoritarian and one democratic, that have decided to 
impose the same tax rate and the same spending on the public good. Under authoritarian rule, 
the dictator sets k equal to zero and confiscates all tax revenue that remains after financing the 
public good; under democratic rule the remaining tax revenue is distributed as a lump-sum 
social transfer. But this social transfer will tend to reduce labor supply under democracy along 
both the intensive (“how many hours should I work?”) and extensive (“should I work at all?”) 
incentive margins.
9 The impact of democracy on continuous labor supply follows from (6) 
and our assumption that leisure is a normal good. The impact of democracy on the discrete 
labor supply decision follows from (7) and (8). Under standard assumptions, if   the 
ratio 
0 → k
) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( k u k u c n − , and hence a*, will tend to zero; if k takes on some positive value, so 
will  ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( k u k u c n − , and hence a*. Thus, in an economy without social transfers every 
agent participates in the workforce, while in an economy with social transfers low-wage 
workers supply no labor at all. Labor force participation is therefore bound to be higher under 
autocracy than democracy. 
 
3. Fiscal policy 
3.1 A benevolent social planner  
As a benchmark, we characterize the allocation that would be chosen by a utilitarian 
government that determines t, k, and g so as to maximize the sum of individual utilities. 
                                                 
9 Here, the argument that labor supply will be lower under democracy is obviously partial, since it does not 
account for the fact that optimizing dictators and democratic governments set different tax rates, or spend 
different amounts on public goods. As we discuss below, autocrats will find it optimal to impose higher tax rates 
than democracies, and these added tax distortions must be accounted for when computing the overall production 
differential between autocracy and democracy.   10
Letting   denote the indirect utility function of individual i, the government 
solves the problem  
) ), 1 ( ( k t w v i −





a dF k t w v ) ( ) ), 1 ( ( max
, ,
,         ( 1 0 )  
subject to (2), and the budget constraint 
  ,           ( 1 1 )   g k tY + =
where 
  ∫ − =
a
g t k a
i i i a dF k t w n w Y
) , , ( *
) ( ) ), 1 ( ( .        ( 1 2 )  
Our definition of GDP in (12) will allow for fiscal policy to have an effect on both the 
continuous and the discrete labor supply decisions, i.e., the derivative  / Yt ∂ ∂  accounts for the 
impact of t on both the integrand and the limit level of integration.  
  Differentiating the Lagrangean for this optimization problem with respect to k, t and g 
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t a dF t a g A n
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i i i 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' μ λ ,       ( 1 5 )  
where, using Roy’s identity,  i λ  is individual i’s marginal utility of income, μ  is the marginal 
utility of income in the public sector, and  0 = i n  for all  ) , , ( * k t g a ai ≤ . Conditions (13) and 
(14) are identical to those generated by the standard problem of optimal linear income   11
taxation.
10 For later reference, it is helpful to note that (14) implies that a benevolent social 
planner will always choose an optimal tax rate that is on the upward-sloping segment of the 
Laffer curve; since  0 > μ , and since the integral on the left-hand side takes a positive value, it 
follows that the terms in curled brackets must take a positive value.  
The left-hand side of (15) is society’s marginal benefit from productive public goods, 
and the right-hand side is society’s marginal cost. The marginal benefit consists of the 
weighted average of agents’ productivity increase from spending on public goods, where the 
weighting factor is the agent’s marginal utility of income,  i λ . Since a benevolent planner 
cares about agents’ welfare, the productivity increase is measured net of tax, i.e., marginal 
take-home pay is what matters. Society’s marginal cost is the product of the marginal utility 
of income in the public sector, μ , and the direct resource cost, which consists of the cost (of 
unity) of purchasing one extra unit of productive public goods, minus the induced increase in 
tax revenue (via a larger tax base) that is generated by an extra unit of the public good.  
For further interpretation of (15), it is useful to first consider the case where a 
benevolent planner has access to individualized lump-sum taxes. In this case  , and  0 = t






i a dF a n g A 1 ) ( ) ( ' ,        ( 1 6 )  
where   is labor supply in a first-best equilibrium, without distortionary taxation. Equation 
(16) is the classic optimality condition of Samuelson (1954), modified here for the case of a 
productive public good. Spending on productive public goods should proceed to the point 
where the marginal increase in aggregate production on the left-hand side equals the direct 
marginal resource cost. There are no distributional weights in the summation on the left-hand 
FB
i n
                                                 
10 See e.g. Dixit and Sandmo (1977) for further discussion and interpretation. See also Sandmo (1998), who 
examines optimal provision of non-productive public goods in a linear optimal taxation model.   12
side, i.e., the λ-terms which appear in (15) are missing. Marginal social benefits are linked to 
the increase in aggregate production, and not to how this increase is distributed among 
workers. Thus, in an economy with individualized lump-sum taxes, the problem of 
allocational efficiency is separated from the problem of income redistribution. 
  We now show that the Samuelson condition will in fact apply in the distorted 
economy as well, where equations (13)-(15) characterize optimal choice. To see this, we 
rewrite (15) along the lines of e.g. Sandmo (1998). We define the average of individuals’ 
marginal utilities of income as 
  ) (a dF
a
a
i ∫ = λ λ .         ( 1 7 )  
Using (2), (17) and the fact that  
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δ ,      ( 1 9 )  
where  Y n w i i i λ λ δ / ) , cov( = . Compared to the first-best optimality condition in (16), there 
are four correction factors in (19). On the left-hand side, the aggregate productivity increase – 
which coincides with the left-hand side of (16) – is first transformed into private, net-of-tax 
units by multiplying by the factor  , and then by the factor  t − 1 δ + 1 , which is a normalized 
measure of the distributional characteristics of the public good. Under the standard 
assumption that agents’ labor incomes increase with the wage, while the marginal utility of 
income decreases, δ  will be negative. Thus, a utilitarian planner uses a weighting factor 
δ + 1  that lowers the benefits from spending on productive public goods. The right-hand side 
of (19) contains the third and fourth correction terms. The resource cost is adjusted for the   13
increase in tax revenue that follows from the increase in the tax base generated by an extra 
unit of the public good, the term  . The last correction term is  / tYg ⋅∂ ∂ λ μ , which is the ratio 
of marginal utilities of income in the public and private sectors.  
  It turns out that once we introduce the financing side into the picture, all these 
correction effects cancel out. Since both the benefits from the public good and the costs of 
financing it via income taxation are proportional to workers’ incomes, a self-financed package 
of taxes and spending on public goods can have no effect on the utility distribution. Moreover, 
in the optimum solution, marginal spending on the productive public good will exactly 
balance the disincentive effects from increasing the marginal tax rate. To see why, we rewrite 
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.      (21) 
When we consider the distributional effects from the financing side, the distributional weights 
disappear from the formula altogether for the optimal provision of public goods. Compared to 
the first-best condition (16), equation (21) still contains additional correction terms, thereby 
capturing the tax-base effects of simultaneously increasing spending on productive public 
goods and raising the marginal tax rate. It is a tedious though straightforward exercise, 
relegated to the Appendix, to show that these tax-base effects cancel out, i.e., we have that 
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i a dF a n g A 1 ) ( ) ( ' ,        ( 2 3 )  
i.e., the Samuelson condition applies not only to the first-best setting, but also to the utilitarian 
optimum in an economy with distortive taxation. It should be noted, however, that (23) will 
not generate the same level of spending on productive public goods as (16). In (23) spending 
on productive public goods is conditioned on the labor supply,  , that emerges in a second-
best environment, where the social planner is confined to using distortionary taxation when 
redistributing from rich to poor. In (16), spending on public goods is conditioned on the labor 
supply that arises in a first-best equilibrium, with individualized lump-sum taxes.  
SB
i n
  In this context, it is helpful to note that (23) can be rewritten as  
  ) (g
Y
g
SB α = ,           ( 2 4 )  
where ) ( / ) ( ' ) ( g A g gA g = α , and  () ()
a SB SB
ii a YA g a n d F a = ∫ . This expression says that in a 
utilitarian second-best optimum, the size of the public sector, as a fraction of GDP, is equal to 
the elasticity of the A(g) function with respect to g. In the special case where the A(g) function 
has a constant elasticity, such that  , the optimal share of spending on public goods 
is always equal to 
α g g A = ) (
α . 
  According to the “new view” of optimal public goods provision, there are a number of 
important special cases where the Samuelson criterion is the correct normative criteria for 
public goods provision; see Kaplow (2004) for an overview of the literature. Kaplow (1996) 
discusses special cases in which both the benefits from spending on public goods and the 
required tax adjustments are proportional to income, and in which the Samuelson criterion 
provides all the necessary guidance for a benevolent social planner. Our analysis of 
productive public goods, financed by a system of linear income taxation, produces the same 
result.    15
 
3.2 Autocracy 
We next turn to the fiscal choices of governments that do not maximize a social welfare 
function, namely autocracies and democratic majorities. We start by considering the prototype 
selfish autocrat who maximizes the amount of resources that he can expropriate from the 
private sector, after having incurred the direct resource cost for productive public goods. 
Formally, the autocrat solves the following problem:  





− − ∫ ) ( ) 0 ), 1 ( (
,
,        ( 2 5 )  
subject to (2). In specifying (25) we have exploited the fact that a self-interested autocrat 
always sets  , which implies that  0 = k * aa = . We can write (25) in a more compact form: 




The first-order conditions are: 
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t .           ( 2 8 )  
Equation (27) shows that a rational autocrat chooses the point on the Laffer curve that 
maximizes tax revenue, and that he does not care about deadweight loss per se. Equation (28) 
shows that a rational autocrat invests in the public good to the point where his marginal 
revenue gain (tax rate times the induced increase in the tax base) equals the marginal resource 
cost.  
To proceed, it is useful to note that  
  ) ( ) (
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i η ,    (30) 
where   is the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the 
net-of-tax wage.  
' (1 ) / ii i wt n η =− i n
  Using (29) and (30), we next rewrite the first-order conditions as 
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i η .    (28’) 
  Equation (27’) shows that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity will play a 
decisive role in shaping a rational autocrat’s choice of tax rate. In the limiting case where 
0 → i η  for all i, it follows that  . Thus, with a vertical labor supply curve, an autocrat 
maximizes his tax theft when the tax rate is set at 100 percent. Such a confiscatory tax rate 
will create sizeable deadweight loss. This efficiency loss will depend on the magnitude of the 
compensated labor supply elasticity which, however, is of no concern to the autocrat.  
1 → t
  Combining (27’) and (28’), we obtain 





i a dF a n g A 1 ) ( ) ( ' .        ( 3 1 )  
Thus, a rational autocrat, whose sole objective is to maximize his tax theft, will also rely on 
the Samuelson criterion when spending resources on productive public goods. A rational 
autocrat realizes that spending on productive public goods counteracts the disincentive effects 
from income taxation. Compared to the decision rule of the benevolent social planner, shown 
in (23), the only difference is that the decision rule in (31) is conditioned on the labor supply 
that arises under autocracy. As we will show below, it is easy to come up with examples (built 
around the case where the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is small), where labor supply   17
will be higher under autocracy than with a utilitarian planner. In these examples, it follows 
readily, from comparing equations (23) and (31), that a malevolent dictator spends more on 
productive public goods than a utilitarian planner.  




A α = .           ( 3 2 )  
Just like a benevolent utilitarian planner, the malevolent autocrat will set the relative size of 
the public sector equal to the elasticity of the A(g) function. For the special case of  
() Ag g
α = , the autocrat’s spending on g as a percentage of GDP is simply equal to α . 
 
3.3 Democracy 
Who is in charge of redistributive tax policy and public spending in a democracy? McGuire 
and Olson (1996) assume that a ruling majority determines tax policy, and that the ruling 
majority earns a (possibly large share) of overall market income. Here, we proceed along the 
lines of Meltzer and Richard (1981), and of Niskanen (2003), and assume that the individual 
with median labor market productivity is in charge of determining both the tax rate and 
spending on productive public goods. Specifically, we assume that the tax and spending 
decisions of the government are determined by the voter with median ability, am; this will also 
be the voter with the median wage, wm.
11  
  Our median voter maximizes her indirect utility function  ) ), 1 ( ( k t w v m − , subject to (2) 
and the government’s budget constraint in (11). Formally, the optimization problem is  
                                                 
11 Do voters in our model have the preferences that are required for the median voter theorem to hold? Even 
though our decision problem contains three choice variables, k, t, and g, the budget constraint of the government 
can be used to reduce it to a two-dimensional problem in t and g. Furthermore, our assumption that both the 
benefits from the public good and the costs of financing it via income taxation are proportional to workers’ 
incomes implies that all workers, irrespective of ability ai, will agree on the optimal g. Thus, there will only be 
disagreement on the choice of t. Provided that preferences satisfy the standard single-crossing property, voters 
will have single-peaked preferences in the choice of t. Every voter with ability below (above) the median ability 
would thus prefer a higher (lower) tax rate.   18
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where, using Roy’s identity,  m λ  is the marginal utility of income of the median voter. Several 
observations are in order.  
  First, the structure of the first-order conditions under democracy is identical to the 
structure of the first-order conditions under a benevolent planner. Comparing equations (13)-
(15) to equations (34)-(36), it may be noted that they look the same, except that the integrals 
showing the average marginal utility under a benevolent planner are replaced by the marginal 
utility of income of the median voter under democracy.  
  Second, combining (34), (35) and the budget constraint in (11), we can rewrite the 
first-order condition for the median voter’s preferred tax rate as 
  0 = −
∂
∂
+ m mn w
t
Y
t Y .            ( 3 7 )  
Due to our normalized population function, Y is both total and average (labor) income. Thus, 
(37) replicates the well-known result of Meltzer and Richard (1981) that the choice of tax rate 
in a democracy depends on the difference between average and median income. Here, and in 
what follows, we always assume that the earnings distribution is skewed to the right, so that 
median income falls below average income. Under this assumption, it is only the 
responsiveness of labor supply that prevents the median voter from imposing a tax rate of 100 
percent.    19
  A direct implication of (37), which will be discussed in greater detail below, is that 
changes in the underlying ability distribution that increase the difference between average and 
median ability will raise the preferred tax rate, and lower output. When the ability distribution 
is sufficiently skewed, the median voter will in fact be an individual who lives off social 
transfers, and who does not participate in the labor force, i.e.  0 m n =  in (37). A median voter 
who does not work will not bother about the deadweight loss from taxation, and he will 
therefore prefer the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. Thus, in this special case, the median 
voter behaves like a rational autocrat, who wants to attain the maximum point on the Laffer 
curve.
12  
  Third, it is easy to show that the median voter also prefers to spend resources on 
productive public goods in a way that honors the Samuelson condition. Dividing (36) by (35), 































) 1 ( 1
) ( ) ( '
1
,       ( 3 8 )  
which is identical to equation (21), describing optimal spending on g in the case of a 
benevolent planner. Invoking the derivations shown in the Appendix, (38) reduces to 
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where superscript D refers to the case of democracy. It is again useful to rewrite the first-order 
condition (39) to obtain the optimal value of g as a fraction of GDP: 
  ) (g
Y
g
D α = .           ( 4 0 )  
                                                 
12 In spite of the formal similarity between the first-order conditions under autocracy and democracy when the 
median voter does not work, the optimal levels of taxes and public spending will differ. The first order 
conditions depend on the level of social transfers, k, which are set to zero under rational autocracy, and to some 
positive number under democracy. Thus, democratic decision-making generates income effects that are not 
present under rational autocracy.    20
4. Some illustrations 
McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (2003) argue that democracies are bound to pursue 
fiscal policies that generate higher output than rational dictatorships. It is easy to show that 
this conclusion need not hold. Let us introduce the following assumptions concerning 
technology and worker preferences: 
            ( 4 1 )  
α g g A = ) (
 ) 1 ln( ln ) , ( i i i i n b c n c u − + = .         ( 4 2 )  
Equation (41) implies that the A(g) function has a constant elasticity with respect to g. From 
equations (24), (32) and (40), it then follows that the share of spending on public goods as a 
percentage of GDP will be α under all three forms of government. Thus, to find out whether 
dictatorship leads to less or more spending on public goods, all we need to know is whether 
GDP will be higher or lower under dictatorship.  
  In fact, when workers have logarithmic preferences, as in equation (42), it is 
straightforward to show that GDP will always be highest under autocracy. Equation (42) 
implies that the labor supply function becomes: 
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Since a rational autocrat sets k to zero, it follows immediately that aggregate labor supply, and 
hence GDP, will be higher under dictatorship than with a median voter or a benevolent 
planner. The reason is that with  , it follows from (43b) that every individual with ability 
greater than zero will work, irrespective of the income tax rate. Further, it follows from (43a) 
that everyone will supply   hours of work, irrespective of the going tax rate. Since, for 
this case, the uncompensated wage elasticity is zero, it follows from (27’) that the rational 
autocrat will maximize his tax revenue by setting t arbitrarily close to unity. 
0 = k
) 1 /( 1 b +  21
  Under democracy (or under a benevolent planner), the tax rate will be bounded away 
from unity, and k will be some positive number. For these reasons, fewer people will go to 
work in a democracy, and those who go to work will work shorter hours. Thus, with 
logarithmic preferences (42), GDP will be lower in democracy (or with a benevolent social 
planner), and there will also be less spending on productive public goods.  
  Although empirical studies for different countries suggest that the labor supply curve 
is close to vertical for some groups in the labor market, the most natural approach is to 
proceed under the assumption that the aggregate labor supply curve slopes upwards, i.e., the 
uncompensated labor supply curve is greater than zero. To examine this possibility, we have 
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Intuitively, the larger the value of ρ , the greater is the responsiveness of labor supply to 
changes in the net wage.  
  A second important parameter for the comparison across forms of government is the 
degree of skewness of the underlying distribution of abilities. Since our model of democracy 
builds on the median voter theory of income distribution of Meltzer and Richard (1981), a 
larger difference between mean and median ability will lead to a higher tax rate under 
democracy, and a larger disincentive to labor supply. In our simulations, we used a lognormal 
distribution  
 







−− =⋅  
to characterize the ability distribution. Here, μ  and σ  are the mean and the standard 
deviation of the underlying normal distribution. In our simulations, we kept the average   22
ability   constant and equal to unity; for different values of  ) ( i a E σ , we therefore adjusted μ  
so that  . Increasing 
2 () / 2 () 1 Ea e
μσ + == σ  in this fashion will increase the difference between 
mean and median ability. 
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  Figure 1 shows the combinations of the labor supply parameter ρ  and the degree of 
(right-hand) skewness of the ability distribution for which rational autocracy leads to higher 
GDP than democracy. Points to the south-east of the solid curve represent parameter 
configurations where autocracy gives higher GDP, while the opposite holds for points to the 
north-west of the curve. Obviously, if the difference between average and median ability is 
not very large, autocracies will have a larger GDP than democracies only in those cases where 
the compensated labor supply elasticity is “almost” zero (i.e. when ρ  is close to zero). 
However, when the difference between average and median income becomes sufficiently 
large, autocracies will have a larger GDP even if the labor supply curve is fairly elastic.  
 
5. Ageing voters: the march towards Leviathan?  
In the end, the vibrant economy of the United States out-competed the rigid resource 
allocation system of the Soviet Union. Whereas this undisputed fact is often interpreted as a 
manifest illustration of the economic superiority of democratic rule over dictatorship, our 
analysis suggests that the form of government is not necessarily the decisive factor. 
Depending on the economic environment – the preferences of households and the distribution 
of abilities – democracy might produce either more or less output than a rational dictatorship. 
Unfortunately, the appealing notion that democratic rule is a necessary and sufficient   23
requirement for rapid growth and high income is not correct.
13 In fact, it is quite easy to use 
the numerical model of Section 4 to construct cases – i. e., points in (σ, ρ) space of Figure 1 – 
such that the median voter will end up supplying zero hours of work, thereby acting just like a 
revenue-maximizing Leviathan. 
  Let us conclude by applying our theoretical considerations to an analysis of the fiscal 
choices of industrialized democracies over the coming decades. According to the received 
wisdom, the forces of tax competition and increased economic integration should in the 
longer run lead to a reduction in both public sector budgets and tax rates in many European 
countries. As tax bases become more elastic, the deadweight losses associated with existing 
tax systems will grow larger, and democratic governments (which, for the sake of argument 
we assume to be elected by median voters) will cope by cutting tax rates.  
  The tax competition argument assumes that future median voters are as concerned 
about deadweight loss as the median voters of today. However, the unprecedented process of 
population ageing suggests that this need not be the case. In the coming decades the older 
population will grow much faster than the total population in most developed democracies. 
According to the United Nations (2002), about 37 percent of the European population is 
projected to be 60 or over in 2050, an increase from 20 percent in 2000. In some countries, 
these changes are projected to be particularly dramatic. By 2050, more than two out of every 
five individuals are projected to be at least 60 years of age in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Slovenia and Spain; moreover, except for the Czech Republic, more than 
one third of the population is projected to be aged 65 or older in 2050. As can be seen from 
Table 1, the projected changes are not so dramatic everywhere, but the tendencies are the 
same.  
                                                 
13 It should also be noted that cross-country evidence on the causal effect of form of government on income is 
mixed. Barro (1996) finds that the overall effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative, while Rigobon and 
Rodrik (2004) find that democracy promotes economic performance. See also Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and 
Persson and Tabellini (2005).    24
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  These developments, which suggest a sharp increase in the fraction of pensioners, can 
be expected to have significant political economy implications. Today, a majority of the 
population of voting age (roughly everyone above age 20) earns income in the labor market. 
In the coming decades, this is likely to change. Provided that labor force participation rates in 
different age categories remain at current levels also in the future, the rapid ageing shown in 
Table 1 will imply that a majority of the voting population will soon live off various kinds of 
social transfers (pensions, unemployment benefits, social assistance, etc).  
  If our analysis in this paper is correct, this development will have dramatic 
consequences for fiscal choices in the future. In section 3, we showed that a median voter who 
lives off social transfers and does not work will not care about deadweight loss, and he will 
prefer the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue. In effect, the median voter will mimic a 
rational autocrat, who seeks out the maximum point on the Laffer curve.
14
  Where does all this lead us? On the one hand, tax competition can be expected to 
exacerbate the deadweight loss of taxation; ceteris paribus, this tends to lower future tax 
rates. On the other hand, population ageing suggests that the median voter can be expected to 
pay less attention to tax distortions; ceteris paribus, this tends to increase future tax rates. In 
the end, whether future tax rates will be higher, lower, or approximately unchanged, seems 
like one of those questions that only the foolish answer with certainty. 
                                                 
14 Now, a change in the age distribution, leading to a larger fraction of pensioners, is not necessarily equivalent 
to a change in the underlying distribution of abilities such that the median voter chooses to supply zero hour of 
work. Technological changes may affect different age groups differently, and the endogenous results of such 
changes can be observed in the form of a smaller fraction of the electorate belonging to the labor force. For the 
age groups below the official retirement age, we can see that the inflow of women to the labor market keeps 
overall labor force participation rates roughly constant in the OECD. At the same time, labor force participation 
among men is falling OECD (2005, Table B and Table C).   25
Appendix: Derivation of equations (23) and (39) 
In equations (21) and (38), we showed that the following condition summarized optimal 
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where f(w*) is the density function for the wage distribution. Using (8), it follows that 
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Substituting (A2)-(A5) into (A1), we obtain: 
  ∫ =
a
a
i i a dF a n g A 1 ) ( ) ( ' , 
which is the result shown in equations (23) and (39).   26
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Table 1. Population ageing, projected trends in selected democracies 
  Share of population above age 60 
 2000  2025  2050 
Austria 20.7  33.0  41.0 
Czech Republic  18.4  29.5  40.1 
France 20.5  28.7  32.7 
Germany 23.2  33.2  38.1 
Italy 24.1  34.0  42.3 
Japan 23.2  35.1  42.3 
Spain 21.8  31.4  44.1 
Sweden 22.4  32.4  37.7 
United Kingdom  20.6  29.4  34.0 
United States  16.1  24.8  26.9 
Source: United Nations (2002). 
 
 





Figure 1: Parameter configurations for which democracy leads to a 
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